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the systemic Crisis of 





at the time this essay is being written, January/February 2009, the systemic crisis of capitalism, which began in 2007/2008, seems to be pointing toward the temporary nationalization of the banking system, 
particularly in the united states and england, even as its macroeconomics of 
incomes and jobs darkens in various countries. overall, this confirms that, 
among other reasons, the crisis arose from the extreme exacerbation of the free-
market, conservative developmental paradigm put into place in the early 1970s. 
as the crisis unfolds, government is getting ready for the biggest intervention 
in the history of capitalism, clearly revealing the dimensions of the state vis-à-
vis macroeconomic of financial wealth. In other words, we are seeing a state in 
which the Central Bank and the treasury spare no effort to defend and sustain 
the wealth from high finance. at the same time, we also see a clamor demanding 
the redefinition of the relationship between the state and the economy, and that 
society and the state control the economy, not the other way around.
What is happening in this crisis befits the nature of capital and unregulated 
capitalism. unlike what some leading commentators might have detected, 
this is not a deformity or a deviation from the essence of the accumulation 
process – whether of productive accumulation, of its articulation with financial 
accumulation or of rendering the latteri autonomous. It’s interesting that part 
of the leftist critique insists on the “productivism” of the “market system”, 
something inherently unattainable by pure market logic. Capitalism is now 
increasingly looking more like itself. economic and political determining factors 
have contributed to this. the period that began in 1970, characterized as 
“financialized capitalism” (Braga, 2000b) – or financially dominated capitalism or 
“finance-led capitalism” (Guttmann & Plihon, 2008) – has now lasted more than 
38 years. In this capitalism, as we shall see, financial wealth supersedes productive 
wealth without hindering it, and expands at greater and greater speeds producing 
structural economic and financial instability.
very well, then. this period has already lasted longer than the famous 30 
glorious years of the golden age of capitalism after World War II.
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the dynamics of the rise and fall of real estate prices, which is at the origin 
of the current crisis, has made clear the extent of financial globalization and the 
intense financialization of economies everywhere. 
Will proposed and roughcast regulation be able to deal with the problems? 
Will they be able to change the systemic pattern of wealth of the last 38 years?
do the necessary changes have the backing of high-level politicians who 
are up to the task, of proper and well-equipped political parties and legislative 
bodies, and of active social movements capable of “pushing” in the proper 
direction?
Financial Wealth and the Capitalist State2 
after the Lessons of 1929
Present events have been fermenting for decades, so the following will help 
us to understand what is now (2007/2009) going on.
In bull times, only the market exists; in bearish times, everybody cries out 
for the state. and we are not referring only to that old safeguard, the Central 
Bank as lender of last resort: we will examine the unspoken maxim that guides 
a kind of division of labor between the public and private sectors in governing 
our present-day free-market, unregulated or non-regulated capitalist economies. 
When the production economy (income and jobs) goes well and is followed by an 
increase in asset prices (stocks, real estate etc.), the job of the state is simply not 
to meddle (sic!). When the wealth begins to lose its value and economic crises 
arise, the state is called upon by the so-called markets to take adequate measures 
and avoid “the worst”: the depreciation of private holdings.
the chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed), the american Central Bank, 
declared in 1999/2000 that interest rates would be reduced if there were signs 
that the economy was moving toward a “hard landing” – a pearl of nomenclature 
that won the media’s heart. What Mr. alan Greenspan said, in other words, was 
that monetary policy would remain expansive, providing the necessary liquidity to 
avoid a critical cessation of american prolonged economic growth.
J. K. Galbraith was deliciously ironical when made mention of the official 
names people used to refer to capitalist instability. over the last century or 
so, words have been losing substance and meaning: panic, crisis, depression, 
recession, readjustment. the current nomenclature resorts to commercial aviation 
and insists on soft landings and hard landings. this is curious, because facetious 
pilots like to say that a successful flight is one with both a take-off and a landing, 
since the former is optional but the latter is compulsory. a capitalist flight, 
therefore, to use the now fashionable metaphor, is always successful – at most, 
there are different degrees of comfort or discomfort in the landing that precedes 
a subsequent take-off. the events of 2008/2009 have clearly lain to rest these 
attenuating names by exposing the world to the multiple faces of the systemic 
crisis of globalized, finance-dominated capitalism.
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It was implied that the government would always be there to ensure the 
continuity of the “irrational exuberance” denounced even by the american 
conductor of globalized, dollarized financial accumulation. In other words, 
“systemic risk” would always be bypassed and numerous speculative positions 
would eventually be sanctioned – and only those who exaggerated their Ponzi 
schemes would fall in disgrace.3 For this reason, to the surprise of many at the 
time, markets all around the world grew by leaps and bounds soon after these 
“assurances” of prompt government intervention, revealing the autonomous 
nature of financial wealth. the state that issues the world’s “dominant” currency 
enters the stage as a guarantor of last resort to increase asset prices, which are 
repeatedly setback by instability and market-induced crises. to be sure, this 
does not always ensure that “systemic risk” can be avoided, but implies that 
government efforts will “interminably” help the financial wealth market. one 
might say that, as paradoxical as it may seem, the golden rule of liberal capitalist 
globalization is: the state will always rescue markets where securities are not only 
traded speculatively – speculation is a given in this system – but also disruptive of 
the market rules themselves!
superspeculation took hold in other countries and other times before 
the current “explosion”. In the 1990s, after the speculative peak of the stock 
exchange and real estate market, numerous expansionist monetary and fiscal steps 
were taken in Japan to prevent the stagnation of GdP from becoming a crisis. 
one might ask how ruinous the Japanese hard landing would have been without 
these interventions. the nikkei index tumbled from 45,000 to 15,000 between 
1989 and 1992 and, if left to the market, the adjustment of such immense 
devaluation would have led the Japanese economy into a great depression. the 
american stock exchanges (or any other, for that matter) had never seen such a 
violent fall before.
In 1997, in attempting to control the crisis, the south Korean government 
even resorted to bank nationalization simply to avoid a disruptive chain reaction 
of insolvency. (the government later had difficulty reselling the banks to private 
capital.) In addition, public resources were injected into other banks facing 
difficulties. The Economist (6/2/2002) reported that the Korean government 
spent approximately $88 billion rescuing the banks.
the fiscal cost of the crises between 1977 and 1995 is impressive. It is 
estimated Japan spent 20% of GdP after 1992 to counter the stagflation caused 
by wealth devaluation after the speculative excesses in real estate and stocks. 
norway spent 8% of GdP between 1987 and 1993; spain 5.6% between 1977 
and 1985; sweden 4% in 1991; and the united states 3.2% of GdP between 1981 
and 1991.4
If a nation could not autonomously rescue its financial or currency 
exchange systems, multilateral agencies were called upon, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and imposed their 
well-known conditions. In the case of argentina, these conditions meant a very 
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steep social and economic cost to revive the “currency board” system, because 
they required the “dollarization” of public and private debt and an even greater 
relinquishing of sovereignty. the tourniquet applied to public finances prevented 
the various levels of government from eventually adopting a development agenda. 
on the other hand, however, if cast to the autonomous interplay of market forces, 
the argentinean monetary system would have already been destroyed by the 
foreign exchange crisis.
these international economic policy designs to control crises revealed a 
special double-sided trait of this liberalism coetaneous with globalization: first, 
unrestricted freedom for markets and capital to produce and realize wealth 
the world over; second, in times of crisis, when this wealth is depreciated, free 
rein to government agencies –the Central Bank and the national treasury – to 
defend and protect private holdings, even at the cost of undesired monetary 
expansion, fiscal burden, high unemployment, yielding of decision-making power 
to international agencies. In times of euphoria, the market is king; when things 
shrivel up, state measures are called for.
From the 19th century to the Great depression of the 1930s, asset price 
devaluation has had deep effects on private holdings, with the generalized failure 
of banking, industrial and commercial establishments. But a new phase of growth 
then began, led by new entrepreneurs and by those that managed to survive the 
wild competition of harder times. after the catastrophe of the 1930s, it became 
clear that similar events might be avoided with Big Bank (Central Bank) and Big 
Government interventions – and, indeed, major crises were avoided, recessions 
were controlled and kept from becoming depressions, and unemployment fell. 
the cost, however, were inflationary tensions, created especially by the profit 
margins of the oligopolies, which they preserved as a compensation for times of 
apathetic economic activity.
What is new in today’s economic liberalism is that crises are managed with 
the specific purpose of defending private holdings, an attitude that connives and 
abets speculation and fictitious financial wealth.
If Big Government, in a sense, left the scene after some economically 
liberating reforms, the opposite happened to Big Bank. during the period 
immediately prior to the current systemic crisis, beginning in 2007, production-
oriented, infrastructure-creating, fiscally countercyclical and anti-unemployment 
spending by government ceased, relatively speaking. But the central banks and 
multilateral institutions, kept by public money, remain permanently present to 
assure an interminable increase in private wealth appreciation.
In this process, discussing the moral hazard5 of the rescue operations of 
Central Banks is somewhat hypocritical, seeing that in the current situation they 
cannot do otherwise. the Central Banks and the treasuries have become hostage 
to the marketplace and will remain so while the system’s patterns of wealth do not 
change. aware of this, private decision-makers plunge voraciously into speculative 
gain – and, abetted by the premise of being too big to fail, the overwhelming 
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majority is successful (they can, furthermore, count on the government to rescue 
the markets if all else fails). Microeconomic risk, being a private matter, obviously 
does not disappear; “systemic risk”, on the other hand, is deemed by the 
wealthy a matter of great public importance – the ups and downs of most of the 
population are of only marginal concern and, at most, some programs to provide 
minimum income, unemployment insurance and social assistance will be crated 
for those victimized by the doldrums in economic activity.
However, as we have stressed, it is not merely a matter of the lender of last 
resort protecting the illiquid but not the insolvent, as Bagehot proposed more 
than a century ago. It is much more than this: at the zenith of neoliberalism, 
the state becomes the guarantor, the co-regulator, the orchestrator of 
the macroeconomic financial wealth through the public/private financial 
macrostructure.6 earlier, the state ensured productive profits by co-galvanizing 
effective demand. now, with its fiscal powers shackled and ejected from this role, 
government finances, fiscal management and monetary management become 
fundamental elements in the reproduction of the macroeconomics of financial 
wealth. this is not minimal state; it is maximal state taking active part in the 
reproduction of abstract financial wealth. It is a radically non-conservative 
practice, to be sure. one would have thought that, sooner or later, this “economic 
liberalism by the elites for the elites” would become unsustainable, seeing that its 
iron laws apply only to the have-nots, to the “misgoverned ” peripheries of the 
system, whereas individuals, companies and countries of the “elite” can count on 
the unproductive state to guarantee and oversee the reproduction of wealth.
of late, the state (i.e., the minimal state, where the conservative policies 
of economic liberalism reign) has been concerning itself less and less with the 
macroeconomics of employment and income, and more and more with the 
macroeconomics of financial wealth (thus becoming the maximal, intervening 
state).
Big Bank after the Onset of the Crisis in 20077
as the american real estate crisis irrupted and as it became clear that it 
would infect the banking and financial systems of important countries, many 
were asking by mid-2007 what the Central Banks might do.
the european Central Bank was the first to make an unequivocal 
statement – followed, after some drawbacks, by the american and english. Big 
Bank has the intrinsic role of rescuing financial capitalism at the crossroads, 
when financial capitalism gives signs of being incapable of dealing with the global 
instabilities it creates. Liquidity is provided, various support mechanisms are 
created, interest rates are slashed etc. Big Bank becomes not a mere lender of last 
resort, but also a market maker of last resort – that is, a purchaser of debt from 
private agents in desperate need of liquidity when no other buyer can be found in 
the marketplace. and how do they become liquid? By exchanging the toxic bonds 
they hold for public bonds, which they can then readily convert to cash.
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that is why the three decisions made at the time, the latter half of 2007, 
were coherent and understandable – even if two of them were preceded by doubts, 
polemics and morel condemnation. the matter continued to inflame arguments 
and interests. In europe, the press reported the appearance of new financial 
bubbles in emerging countries, supposedly caused by the adopted measures.
the truth is that whoever is in “command” at the relevant Central Banks 
will be forced to take measures to halt the increasing depreciation of financial 
wealth and prevent the paper wealth accumulated during the “financial boom” 
from going to dust.
Without today’s high finance it is impossible to understand the meaning 
of modern financial capitalism. High finance is created by the bursaries or finance 
department of the productive corporations themselves. and therein lies an 
important novelty of globalization, because for these corporations, financial gains 
(i.e., the increasing value of their financial assets) are a goal in themselves. their 
interests match those of the banks and other monetary organizations, as well as 
those of the large financial creditors, forging the hard core of modern financial 
capitalism: high finance.
since the catastrophe of the 1930s, which began with the crash of the 
new York stock exchange in 1929, high finance and governments learned how to 
make Big Bank, however recalcitrant, follow the “right path”.
Prior to their decisions to salvage the system, everything that was spoken and 
written on the style of the Central Banks’ chairmen, the analyses of their speeches, 
the hollow words about moral hazard merely helped to cloud the issue and confound 
those who have yet to understand what financial capitalism is all about.
the current real estate crisis in america, among all post-World War II 
financial crises, was arguably the one most foretold. the surprise was not that 
it occurred, but the extent to which it penetrated national financial systems and 
affected the most eminent financial players, and the insinuating and insidious 
nature of the financial innovations. (not to mention the wholesale omission of 
the monetary, regulatory and overseeing authorities.)
as we now know, mortgages brokered by us institutions were resold to 
financiers in investment funds, pension funds and hedge funds, collateralized 
by the mortgage installments themselves – and, ultimately, by the value of the 
underlying real estate. Housing prices began to rise considerably as the speculative 
scenario was being set up. a perverse “innovation” took place when similar 
operations began to take place with mortgages from “high risk” takers – the 
“subprime borrowers”.
From then on, the miasma of financial “innovation” spread around the 
world, under the auspices of big name market players. a global turbulence ensued. 
Initially, these loans were regrouped into mortgage-backed securities, which 
enjoyed a highly liquid and dynamic secondary market in the united states. 
next, the mortgage-backed securities were further grouped with other bonds 
(credit card debt, auto rentals, corporate accounts receivable etc.) and rearranged 
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with other collateralized mortgage bonds. In yet another innovative financial 
operation, these new end-products were dubbed “collateralized debt obligations 
securities” – i.e., structured credit securities for investors and debt obligations for 
debtors.
these investment bank financial inventions were, according to the 
Financial Times, “tailor-made for specific customers […] never traded […] and 
not continuously validated by an active secondary market.” according to Richard 
Beales (2007), it is understandable that the question was asked “whether in 
fact the hedge funds, investment banks and even pension funds and insurance 
groups knew how much the securities they held were worth”. Monetary and 
other authorities let things run loose, with no oversight, no intervention and no 
prevention, in spite of all the talk about what was to come.
It must be stressed that in “bull” times, only the market exists; in “bear” 
times, every expert seeks solace in the state. In this process, the moral hazard 
debate (that is, the risk that private wealth managers will act with less financial 
discipline if they take for granted that government will intervene to avoid a 
financial crash) borders on the hypocritical, inasmuch as there are no alternatives 
in the current situation. the Central Banks and the treasuries have become 
hostage to the marketplace and will remain so while the system’s patterns of 
wealth do not change. Government intervention to avoid catastrophe does not 
insufflate the erroneously name “bubbles”; it is present-day financial capitalism 
that engenders structural financial instability.
Needed Regulation  
and the Obstacles to Regulated Capitalism8
as we’ve seen, financial capitalism contrived a systemic crisis in 
unregulated “global” capitalism in 2007/2008. the high profile of the affected 
organizations, the bankruptcies and capital centralization of the financial system 
– Bank of america + Merrill Lynch is just one example – and the characteristics 
of the measures taken by Central Banks are a sufficient demonstration. Regarding 
the latter, and in particular those by the Fed, the american Big Bank, and those 
of the us treasury, there is no doubt that they saw the ugly mask of systemic risk. 
evidence for this is mounting: the magnitude of the public resources involved, 
the interventionist novelties, the types of institutions being rescued, the number 
of important countries involved, the foundering of the deregulation canons, the 
generous provisions of liquidity, the financial support, the falling interest rates, 
the nationalization-by-any-other-name, and so on.
the world has been living for 38 years, since early 1970, without gold-
backed dollars, with floating exchange rates and conservative reforms, under the 
systemic pattern of wealth of finance-driven capitalism. In these 38 years, several 
periods of instability and crises have occurred, but none as deep and as “global” 
as the present one. the processes that had maintained the financial movements 
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of wealth appreciation seem to have jammed, producing an international 
depreciation trend of undetermined duration.
We have reached this predicament through financial globalization and 
the financialization of capitalism, by which paper wealth is multiplied relatively 
independent of real variables, namely, how much the productive assets are 
worth. every player is involved in this process, including productive corporations 
that have embedded financial goals into their objectives – it is impossible to 
overemphasize this point. abundant, more recent interpretations, especially in 
the media, emphasize the negligence of regulators, the lack of ethics etc. these 
factors clearly exist and had their share of responsibility, but we must delve deeper 
into the root causes of the crisis and see how the structures of this capitalism were 
moving.
the truth is that private, extremely high-leverage operations preponderated 
and Central Banks and national treasuries became hostage to this dynamic, as 
we’ve seen. at the height of the speculative frenzy, the empire of the marketplace; 
at the nadir, aid from the state. and this has been happening with every 
turbulence of the last 38 years.
We must remember that the regulatory environment of these years was 
inspired by the Basel agreements that included capital-to-assets requirements for 
each type of risk, the oversight of risk classification agencies, self-management 
models “set up” by the large banks, the “oversight at a distance” of Central 
Banks, and an assumed “discipline of the marketplace” to make information 
transparent.
the Central Banks gave free rein to the system’s ability to create 
fictitious wealth on a “global” scale, allowing the significant direct and indirect 
participation of banks through the parallel organizations they created. these 
“special” organizations, the exotic financial instruments and their corresponding 
practices became known to experts as the “shadow financial system”: a make-
believe world of uncontrolled self-expansion operating outside the banks’ balance 
sheets, beyond the view of regulatory and monetary authorities.
as Cintra and Farhi (2008) explain:
according to Paul McCulley, executive director of the world’s largest resource 
management organization, Pimco, the global shadow banking system includes all 
the agents involved in leveraged loans that do not have (or did not have according 
to the rules in effect before the onset of the crisis) access to deposit insurance 
and/or the rediscount operations of Central Banks. these agents are also not 
subject to the prudent guidelines of the Basel agreements. this definition 
includes the large independent investment banks (brokers-dealers), hedge funds, 
investment funds, private equity funds, the various special investment vehicles, 
pension funds and insurance companies. In the united states, it also includes 
regional banks specializing in mortgages (which have no access to rediscount) 
and semipublic organizations (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) that were created to 
provide liquidity to the american real estate market.
estudos avançados 23 (65), 2009 97
according to these authors, over-the-counter markets (otC) have been 
widely used since 1980 to trade the financial derivatives with which financial 
institutions sought to protect themselves against risks in foreign exchange, interest 
rates and the market price of other assets. they also speculated on the trends of 
those prices or were involved in arbitrage operations.
the relationship between the banking system and the shadow banking 
system began in the late 1990s, according to the same authors, and went way 
beyond the former granting credit to the latter. otC markets began to trade 
credit derivatives and other securities broadly known as “structured products”. 
since then, the banking system and the shadow banking system have become 
almost inextricably interpenetrated.
these connections help to explain the contamination, the intermarket 
and interplayer dissemination and the international generalization of the so-
called “subprime crisis”, which was at first an american problem. It seems to us, 
however, that this is only one of the many explanations involved.
at the economic Club of new York, Paul volcker, former chairman of the 
Fed, observed on april 8, 2008:
today, much of the financial intermediation takes place in markets beyond 
effective official oversight and supervision, all enveloped in unknown trillions 
of derivative instruments. It has been a highly profitable business, with finance 
accounting recently for 35 to 40 percent of all corporate profits.
When the depreciation began, the Central Bank stepped in, going from 
omission to action. It is what we have been witnessing in its operations as lender 
of last resort – even for investment banks, which actually lie beyond the Fed’s 
sphere of competence – and as “market maker”, providing liquidity to a locked-in 
credit market. the Fed accepts securities that has no buyers and exchanges them 
for treasury bills that can be readily converted into cash.
Yet the crisis persists. some believe it might become increasingly and 
unstoppably more severe. strictly speaking, no one knows, because one of 
the traits of the present situation is precisely the shadows cast on all relevant 
information! even if after 12 or 18 months (the “magic” number mentioned by 
many) the worse is over, the pertinent question is: will we have begun an in-depth 
process to redefine how the system is regulated? or will only palliative measures 
be taken while the overall patterns remain unchanged? 
the necessary reforms must impose limits to the financial competition that 
is at the root of the multiplication of paper wealth. they require international 
financial discipline. this means enforcing limits to much that previously 
seemed virtuous: self-regulation by financial players and markets, securitization, 
derivatives, high leverage, financial supermarket organizations, permissiveness in 
financial innovations etc.
Central Banks and governments have done and will continue to do 
whatever is necessary to rescue their capitalist economies. Regulating capitalism 
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per se, however, is a wholly different story – tense, of undetermined duration, 
perhaps inconclusive. Paul volcker anticipated as much in his speech:
no one will benefit from regulation and supervision which is unduly intrusive 
and arbitrary. venture capital and equity funds have been two successful, 
creative and valuable parts of american capital markets. By their nature, they 
are dependent on strong and sophisticated investors, so systemic implications of 
failure of particular funds is unlikely. Consequently the case for either official 
liquidity support or direct regulatory intrusion is weak.
With the recent events, many barriers have been crossed under the 
emergency threat of disruption. developing a longstanding regulatory framework, 
however, is a wholly different discussion and a decision of another nature.
For a long time now, many have been warning in vain about the need for a 
new international financial and monetary architecture. Without a true reform, the 
scenario will remain one of recurring threats of systemic risk and the ensuing social 
and economic burdens. We are living a problematic historical knot: disarray under 
unregulated capitalism and regulated capitalism no more than a distant mirage.
as the social, economic and financial situation worsens (and things have 
worsened from the last quarter of 2008 to now, first quarter of 2009), the 
consensus seems to be strongly pending toward regulation and government 
intervention.
It is obviously impossible to foresee what the outcome will be, considering 
the complexity of the national and international plans engendered by the crisis 
of capitalist financialization – especially if, in the near future, the financial and 
economic dynamic begins sending signs that “the worst is over”.
For now, the Group of thirty, under the chairmanship of Paul volcker, 
has just released a document entitled “Financial Reform: a Framework for 
Financial stability” containing 18 proposals for regulation and supervision.9 It is 
a document worthy of discussion. Commentators have noticed that bankers are 
asking moderation from regulators in order not to destroy the system’s innovative 
spirit (sic!). these are some of the recommendations: Central Banks should take a 
more relevant preventive role; a single regulatory agency for activities guaranteed 
by deposit insurance; increased capital requirements for banks in bull times, 
enabling them withstand recessive moments better; emphasis on prudential 
regulation; demand that financial institutions take on part of the credit risk 
embedded in securitized products, among others.
In the course of the last few weeks, the crisis has acquired a denser 
contour, to put it strategically, and I believe the relationship between state 
and market, economy and politics etc, are being profoundly revised. the most 
obvious indication of this is explicit or implicit in the need for the temporary 
nationalization of the banking system in the united states and england. 
american banks have been going under even before overseers have been able to 
examine their accounts. nouriel Roubini, the economist whose pessimism was 
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actually analytical realism, estimates that “credit losses could peak at a level of 
$3.6 trillion for u.s. institutions, half of them by banks and broker dealers.” and 
adds: “If that’s true, it means the u.s. banking system is effectively insolvent 
because it starts with a capital of $1.4 trillion.”
other aspects will undoubtedly appear, given the volume of public 
spending, the breadth of fiscal policy, the emergence of a financial policy much 
more comprehensive than mere monetary policy (interest rate management), 
the new income and employment policies, and the initiatives of governmental 
coordination that are emerging from the united states under Barack obama. 
Indeed, because if they do not emerge, the chances of negative growth will surely 
increase.
an article published in 1996, in which I analyzed the dynamics of this 
capitalism that is now facing its belated systemic crises, stressed:
thus, this new dynamic-structural form of capitalism would raise the following 
questions: hasn’t the process of mobility, liberation and illusory multiplication 
of capital as value (a commodity fetish) gone so far that its ability to organize a 
sociable economy (with democratic and civilized association, access to jobs and 
income, vital and cultural expansion) is reaching its historical and social limits? 
therefore, wouldn’t regulation be only a lukewarm approximation of the “tip 
of the iceberg”, the entirety of which would remain “unresolved”? What type 
of transition are we facing? What type of reform is needed over and above some 
sort of re-regulation? What kind of democratic socioeconomic reorganization 
is to be yearned? What type of transition crisis is this that, if mishandled, will 
lead us to a “neobarbarism” – to which the “neoliberal” praxis and its critical-
propositional impotence are a mere introduction? Pragmatically speaking, is it 
possible to regulate globalized capitalism without intervening in the very logic of 
competition and in the desire to accumulate for accumulation’s sake, which today 
is dominated by abstract monetary-financial wealth? (Braga, 1996.)
as I finish this article, I am hearing mostly negative reactions to Barack 
obama’s “first program” to face the economic-financial crisis, announced on 
February 10, 2009. the critics have various ideological hues. a New York Times 
editorial the following day went directly to the point, as we see it: “someone 
should have told treasure secretary timothy Geithner that one thing to avoid at 
a time of uncertainty is raising more questions.”
the core of the problem is that a large number of american banks and 
financial institutions are insolvent and the federal program offered no solid 
strategy for this that might lead to credit being once again available to consumers 
and businesses. Injecting more capital and purchasing the system’s “toxic” assets 
are not a way out, even with at least $1 trillion earmarked for the task.
With regard to stimulating aggregate demand, an $838 billion program 
was announced, involving spending  in infrastructure, income transference 
programs, aid to local and state governments, tax cuts etc.
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For various reasons, the government left some points and procedures 
pending, implying that this is just the first round in a complex web of interests 
and in an economy whose standard of development must be redefined to include 
the viewpoint of most members of american society and their respective impacts 
on the world. the first round was more a reflection of recent united states 
history than of the hopes of change entrusted to the new president. But it is still 
too early for conclusions.
It is human pettiness, however, to constrain the debate and the initiatives 
to no more than regulation and supervision – to weaving “patches”. our hope 
is anchored in reforms capable of changing the patterns discussed here. the 
historian Fernand Braudel comes to mind and was recently cited by ambassador 
Rubens Ricupero (2008):
Braudel compared events to fireflies: they glow, but do not illuminate our path. 
their light is feeble and does not help us to distinguish long durations, the 
century-long cycles. In times such as today’s, this makes it difficult to perceive if 
the tremendous intensity of events means that things have changed forever.
Notes
1 this essay develops and articulates the author’s reflections published “fragmentarily” over 
the last years in Valor Econômico and Folha de s. Paulo newspapers, and in Indicadores, a 
publication specialized in economic conjuncture of the Fundação do desenvolvimento 
administrativo (Fundap), of the são Paulo state government.
2 see Braga (2000a).
3 Increasing indebtedness to pay off debts is a kind of Ponzi scheme, according to H. P. 
Minsky, whereas speculative finance is defined as successive rollovers of debt. Ponzi, by 
the way, is the name of historical megaspeculator.
4 data from an article by Maria Clara R. M. do Prado, published in Valor Econômico 
(12.18.2008, p. a13), from the research by daniela Klingebiel (World Bank) and Patrick 
Honohan (economics department of trinity College, dublin, Ireland).
5 In other works, the risk that private wealth managers will act with less financial discipline, 
so to speak, if they take for granted that governments around the world will intervene to 
avoid a generalized financial crash.
6 according to Braga (2000b), “the financial macrostructure is where the monetary-
financial-ownership operations of various institutions take place – including relevant 
central banks, private banks, various financial organizations, large corporations and 
holders of large fortunes. In many financial markets, these agents determine the 
appreciation and depreciation of currency and assets; they manage the interlinked 
credit and capital markets; they increase automated foreign exchange transactions in 
international trade; and they basically manage ‘financial savings’ and international 
liquidity.”
7 see Braga (2007).
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8 see Braga (2008).
9 see www.group30.org. “Financial Reform: a Framework for Financial 
stability”. see also safatle et al (2009).
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AbstrAct – the financial problems that took place as of 2007 reached an international 
scale and took on characteristics that allow us to define them as a systemic crisis of 
Financial Capitalism, which, in the end of 2008, completed 38 years of existence. In 
order to avoid a financial-economic tragedy such as the one in 1929, the “Big Bank” 
(Central Bank) of each developed country stepped in using well-known instruments as 
well as new ones. despite having avoided a Great depression, this response was not able 
to stop the contamination of the global economy’s productive performance. Besides 
the points mentioned above, this essay discusses the uncertainty that surrounds the 
foundation of an effective regulation and the reform of the current standard of financial 
domination.
Keywords: systemic crisis, financial capitalism, “Big Bank”, Great depression, 
devaluation, reforms uncertainty.
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